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SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
In spite of a commendable 40 percent reduction in the maternal mortality ratio over the last decade
to 194 per 100,000 live births in 2010, improving maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH) care
remains a key development priority given the high inequality that persists between the richest and
the poorest quintiles in Bangladesh. The service delivery systems are met with both supply and
demand side barriers. Recent consensus aims to reduce these barriers to improve basic and
emergency obstetric care, institutional delivery, skilled birth attendance, and family planning
services. To reduce both demand- and supply-side barriers, a demand-side financing (DSF) scheme
was introduced in 2006, which is a combination of supply-side incentives for providers and demandside cash transfers for clients. Although the DSF scheme increased the volume of services provided,
the quality of care was not addressed; also it promoted performance of individual providers instead
of that of the facility. In this context, the Population Council explored the possibilities of introducing a
Pay-for-Performance (P4P) scheme to improve maternal health care services by using a consultative
process. Based on the consultation and in guidance of the Government of Bangladesh, the Council
and UNICEF provided technical assistance to the Directorate General of Health Services (DGHS) to
test the P4P strategies for MNCH service providers to improve service volume and quality of care,
and for the poor clients to receive services subsidized through vouchers or coupons. Using a pre-test
post-test separate sample quasi-experimental design, the study tests two strategies. The first
strategy is a combination of pay-for-performance for providers and subsidized coupons for poor
pregnant women, newborns, and under-five children, while the second strategy employs only the payfor-performance incentives for the providers.

OBJECTIVES
The objective of the study is to test and compare the two service delivery models on utilization of
MNCH services to improve maternal, newborn and under-five children’s health. The specific
objectives are to (i) test the feasibility of implementing performance incentives for providers; and (ii)
evaluate whether payment for providers, with or without subsidized financing for clients, results in
increased utilization of antenatal care, postnatal care, institutional deliveries, and family planning
counseling.

DURATION
The project was initiated in mid-February 2010 and ended in December 2011. The intervention
period was from October 2010 to November 2011.

STUDY SITES
Twelve public-sector health facilities in Jamalpur, Gaibandha and Kurigram districts are the
intervention sites and three facilities of Thakurgaon district comprise the comparison sites. The
DGHS selected these four districts out of its eight maternal and newborn health (MNH) and MNCH
project districts as of 2010.
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ACTIVITIES
The preparatory activities included development of guidelines and manuals, and the formation of
P4P Committees, Quality Assurance Groups (QAGs), Quality Assurance Teams (QATs), fund
operations teams and the MNCH service providers’ teams. A quality assurance system was
developed allowing providers to receive incentives based on facilities’ achievement of targets of
volume and quality of care of emergency obstetric and newborn care (EmONC) services (Figure 3). A
coupon mechanism was developed to provide incentives to the poor clients to receive EmONC
services (Figure 4). A financial mechanism was established through signing contracts between the
facilities and the Council. In the communities, the fieldworkers and volunteers were trained, and
15,696 eligible women were identified using a community level validation process. Of them, 90
percent received coupons and about half received MNCH services from the designated facilities.
Coupon utilization was the highest for antenatal care services followed by delivery, postnatal
complications and delivery complications management. The referral mechanism was strengthened
and all the stakeholders received orientation.
Intervention activities included the QAG visits every quarter while the facilities provided improved
MNCH care and the P4P Committees and QATs carried out monitoring activities. When facilities
received a positive recommendation upon meeting its targets, they provided incentives to the MNCH
teams. In Gaibandha and Kurigram districts, financial assistance in the form of coupon was provided
to poor clients to cover transportation, medicine and incidental costs.
The evaluation activities used a separate sample quasi-experimental pre-post test design and
collected: baseline and endline survey data from 473 providers (Baseline 272; Endline 201) from 15
facilities; monthly service statistics from the 15 facilities over 26 months (pre-intervention- 12
months, during intervention- 14 months); quality of care measurements at the 12 intervention
facilities over 6 quarters; client exit interviews with 2,124 clients at the 15 facilities during the
intervention period; and in-depth interviews with 270 clients at the 15 facilities during the
intervention period.

RESULTS
Feasibility of implementing performance incentives for providers and clients is measured in terms of
operationalization of the incentive schemes, increased volume of services and improvement in
quality of care of the MNCH services at the intervention facilities. Comparison across strategies and
comparison sites indicates that payment for providers, with or without financing for clients, results in
increased utilization of MNCH services.
Change in service volume. The increase in service volume was significantly higher at the intervention
facilities relative to comparison facilities in terms of institutional delivery (Table A.1 and Figure 8).
Institutional deliveries increased by 114 and 32 percent in facilities under strategies I and II,
respectively, relative to the comparison facilities. Strategy I facilities registered higher increases than
strategy II facilities. Antenatal and postnatal care services increased significantly in strategy I sites
relative to comparison sites, but performance in these sites varied significantly during the baseline
survey; therefore, the differences cannot be attributed to the intervention activities alone.
Change in quality of care. The intervention facilities significantly increased quality of care of MNCH
services measured on a 100 point scale (Figure 9). The change was most striking in strategy I (50
percent) than the strategy II site facilities (28 percent). Some of the important changes include:
introducing antenatal and postnatal care corners, breastfeeding corners, and post-operative rooms;
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installing a washroom adjacent to the labor room; and separating the sick newborn care unit within
the pediatric ward of the District Hospital. The facilities managed to increase labor room readiness
and made sitting arrangements for attendants.
Client satisfaction. The overall client satisfaction score was highest in strategy I sites relative to both
the strategy II and comparison sites after adjusting for age, years of education, husband’s education,
total number of children and religion (Table 8). Both strategy II and the comparison sites performed
better in terms of providers’ behavior relative to strategy I sites (Table 9). Client satisfaction was
significantly higher at the strategy I relative to strategy II sites for the medicines being free of cost
and not requiring extra monetary payment.
Provider satisfaction. The provider survey indicated that the group work has become more structured
in complying with guidelines-- strategy I and II site facilities are two and six times, respectively, more
likely to follow structured guidelines relative to the comparison site facilities controlling for the
baseline performance. Providers reported higher rate of reception of the supervisory feedback and
recognition, which were attenuated after adjusting for the baseline performances (Table A.2).

COST OF MATERNAL HEALTH SERVICES
Cost per maternal health service unit including antenatal care, institutional delivery and postnatal
care services is US$ 8 for strategy I and II sites (Table 11). The total incentive cost per unit of
maternal health service unit is lower at the strategy II sites relative to the strategy I sites ($7 versus
$9) because of higher number of service units delivered at strategy II relative to strategy I facilities
while strategy I facilities incurred costs for coupons to the poor clients.

DISSEMINATION
A two-day national level dissemination workshop was organized in December 2011 with the Senior
Secretary, MoHFW as the Chief Guest. The Secretary underscored the role of the P4P models for
incorporating the quality of care in incentive payments, and incorporation of the institution-based
incentives to enhance facility rather than individual performance. He put emphasis on examining
both the DSF and P4P models to better address the MDGs 4 and 5. The participants of the workshop
put forth suggestions for modification of the two models.

CHALLENGES
The prerequisites for initiating a P4P approach for providers with a team approach include
placement of key human resources and equipping the facilities with equipment and supplies. These
prerequisites were not entirely met. The weak management information system (MIS) remained a
challenge for establishing the benchmark level and tracking performance. A simple form was
developed to ensure proper recording of the key services at both the intervention and comparison
sites. Obstetrics, newborn and under-five child complications management service volumes could
not be incentivized on ethical ground although service statistics were monitored, and quality of care
in complications management was incentivized through incorporating indicators in the quality
assessment tool. The team dynamics played a key role in facility performance with a few providers
taking incentives for granted. Measurement of the quality of care of MNCH services underwent
several revisions to reflect the needs of the facilities. The instrument is appreciated for being
detailed, but also faced criticism for featuring a long checklist requiring 4 hours to administer. The
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QAG members decided to divide themselves into two groups to measure the performance of their
respective units simultaneously. Establishing the financial mechanism to track each payment
involved multiple providers and clients and keeping vouchers for each transaction remained
challenging. The competency of the financial operations team was enhanced through an interactive
workshop, supportive follow-up and on-the-job training.

LESSONS LEARNED
Facilities with sub-optimal performance tend to respond to the performance targets in terms of
increasing quantity and quality of MNCH care if it is tied with incentives, in spite of the human
resource and other constraints. However, certain level of infrastructure is pivotal to ensure quality of
care related with offering privacy to the clients. Accountability of the managers and providers can be
increased through administration of the QAG and QAT tools. The visual tool administered by the QATs
improves the internal monitoring system. The QAG tool empowers the external experts to measure
performance and provide constructive feedback. Sharing the tools across all the actors is the key to
success. Setting institutional targets based on the past performance and providing group incentives
can increase the cost of delivery per facility if the facilities have, historically, been performing at a
very low level. In such case, facilities can be enrolled only after achieving a threshold level of
performance targets in order to minimize the cost of incentive per institutional delivery. Using results
from the validation for performance measurement is likely to improve providers’ attitude towards
clients and increase their level of satisfaction. Pre-existing conditions are to be addressed through
behavior change communication activities to mitigate the demand-side barriers. In order to increase
utilization, coupon promotion and payment of transportation costs in actual are important. Lastly,
14-month intervention period is inadequate to bring changes at the outcome level.

NEXT STEPS
The P4P models offering incentives to the providers, with or without the demand-side financing, hold
great potential to enable the health facilities to provide better quality of care in MNCH services
bringing greater accountability and transparency into the health system. Therefore, these strategies
should be pursued through the health financing schemes being implemented in Bangladesh. Given
that both strategies performed well relative to the comparison sites, it is recommended that strategy
II (incentives for providers alone) be introduced in the low performing and poorer regions, while the
poorest areas with greater geographical access limitations would benefit from a combination of a
demand plus supply side P4P approach. However, expansion should be preceded with another study
documenting the changes at the population level outcomes. The DSF scheme should consider
incorporating the quality of care mechanism, group-based incentive payments to the providers based
on institutional performance, and introduction of vouchers for newborn and under-five children’s
care.
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INTRODUCTION
A pilot operations research project to test Pay-for-Performance (P4P) strategies to improve maternal,
newborn, and child health (MNCH) services by addressing the supply- and demand-side barriers was
initiated in Bangladesh in February 2010. United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and Population
Council (the Council) provided technical assistance to support implementation activities by the
Directorate General of Health Services (DGHS), Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) of
the Government of Bangladesh (GoB). The DGHS implemented the intervention activities as a human
resource innovation project under its 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 operational plans. The study is a
component of two ongoing GoB-UN projects, namely, the MNCH and maternal and newborn health
(MNH) projects. The study is funded by the Australian Agency for International Aid (AusAID), Canadian
International Development Agency (CIDA), the United Kingdom's Department for International
Development (DfID), and the European Union (EU) through UNICEF. BRAC and CARE Bangladesh, the
current NGO partners of UNICEF, and the James P. Grant School of Public Health of BRAC University
collaborated with the Council in carrying out the operations research.

CONTEXT
MATERNAL HEALTH
Bangladesh has made tremendous gains in reducing the maternal mortality ratio (MMR) to 194 per
100,000 live births in 2010 (NIPORT, Measure Evaluation, and ICDDR,B 2011). The country needs to
reduce MMR further, to 143 by 2015, to achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 5. In spite
of the MMR reduction, maternal deaths are unacceptably high, with persistent inequality between
the richest and the poorest quintiles (NIPORT, Measure Evaluation, and ICDDR,B 2011). Home is still
the site of 77 percent of deliveries (richest 46% versus poorest 92%), where traditional birth
attendants with little knowledge and skills are primary service providers (NIPORT, Measure
Evaluation, and ICDDR,B 2011). Although 54 percent (richest 82% versus poorest 31%) of pregnant
women receive antenatal care (ANC) from medically trained providers, only one in four women attain
the four recommended ANC visits (NIPORT, Measure Evaluation, and ICDDR,B 2011). Utilization of
postnatal care (PNC) is even worse, with only one-third of women receiving PNC within 48 hours of
delivery from any provider, again with high inequalities (richest 60% versus poorest 16%). Women in
the richest quintile are three times more likely to seek facility care for complications, and two-fifths
of women with complications do not seek services because of cost (NIPORT, Measure Evaluation,
and ICDDR,B 2011).
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NEWBORN, INFANT, AND UNDER FIVE CHILDREN’S HEALTH
Newborn, infant, and under five child mortality rates are 32, 43, 53, respectively (NIPORT, Mitra and
Associates, and MEASURE DHS 2012). According to the Strategic Plan for Health Population and
Nutrition Sector Development Program (HPNSDP) 2011–2016, the GoB intends to reduce these
rates to at least 21, 31, 48, respectively, by 2016 (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2011).
Substantial proportions of newborn deaths are attributed to sepsis, asphyxia, and low birth weight
(Chowdhury 2008), which can be reduced by increased access to obstetric and neonatal care
services. Infant postnatal checkup utilization is nearly similar to women’s PNC. Only 30 percent of
infants receive a check-up from medical provider within two days of birth, with wide disparities
between poorest and richest quintiles (NIPORT, Mitra and Associates, and MEASURE DHS 2012).
Findings suggest alarmingly low use of child health care in Bangladesh. Only one in four children with
diarrheal diseases, and one in three infants with symptoms of acute respiratory infections are taken
to a health facility or medically trained health provider, respectively (NIPORT, Mitra and Associates,
and MEASURE DHS 2012).

FAMILY PLANNING METHODS
Use of family planning (FP) methods is high in Bangladesh, but the country suffers from low
utilization of long-term methods, high levels of discontinuation, and unmet need (NIPORT, Mitra and
Associates, and MEASURE DHS 2012). Although a separate Directorate addresses population
issues, DGHS-run health facilities do not, generally, cater to the FP needs of the huge number of
clients, and miss important opportunities for improving FP service coverage. Current contraceptive
prevalence is 61 percent (NIPORT, Mitra and Associates, and MEASURE DHS), and the country is
under extreme pressure to achieve replacement-level fertility by increasing modern contraceptive
use to at least 72 percent by 2016 (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2011).

CHALLENGES TO MATERNAL, NEWBORN, CHILDREN’S HEALTH AND
FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES
The key challenges to reducing maternal, neonatal and under-five child mortality include lack of
access and inadequate and poor quality of MNCH services. Although the government has developed
a comprehensive MNCH service delivery infrastructure from grassroots to higher levels, significant
underutilization of existing capacity results from both demand- and supply-side barriers. These
barriers can be understood within the context of three delays: (i) delay in deciding to seek care due
to lack of awareness and social-cultural-gender inequality, (ii) delay in reaching a medical facility due
to transportation obstacles, and (iii) delay in receiving adequate treatment or management at
facilities (Thaddeus and Maine 1994). The first two delays reflect demand-side barriers, while the
third is supply-side, which, in turn, affects demand-side barriers. For instance, low quality, or
unavailable services at facilities reduce demand for MNCH services. As half of the MMR is directly
caused by eclampsia and hemorrhage, to further reduce MMR it is critical that public-sector health
facilities, mostly servicing the poor, significantly improve their emergency obstetric and newborn care
(EmONC) services. Recent consensus, mindful of the three delays, aims to reduce demand- and
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supply-side barriers to MNCH services in order to improve basic and emergency obstetric care,
institutional delivery, skilled birth attendance, and family planning services.
On the supply side, health facilities often operate at less than capacity in Bangladesh. Shortages of
qualified staff, essential drugs and supplies, combined with administrative delays and clinical
mismanagement, are key barriers to improve the quality of MNCH services. The shortage and suboptimal performance of service providers are the most important supply-side challenge in
Bangladesh (Talukder and Rob 2009). Bangladesh is one of the few countries in which physicians far
exceed nurses and trained midwives, but most physicians are concentrated in urban areas, as rural
sites do not offer urban amenities and have limited scope for private practice. Shortages in skilled
health workers are results of weak incentive and low remuneration for public healthcare workers
(UNICEF 2008). Remuneration of the public-sector providers is well below the private sector, and the
providers do not receive any performance incentive. As a result, public-sector providers remain
absent, and tend to refer patients to their own private clinics for personal gain, or alternatively, they
charge unofficial fees when services at government facilities are supposed to be free or very low
cost. This situation increases the poor’s out-of-pocket cost and makes obtaining necessary services
difficult (Rob, Talukder and Ghafur 2006). Poor supervision and monitoring systems, and absence of
financial incentives, also discourage provider accountability and responsiveness to patients. These
factors indicate that service providers can be motivated by financial gain tied with performance
targets.

INTERVENTION STRATEGIES
To reduce both demand- and supply-side barriers in Bangladesh, a demand-side financing (DSF)
scheme was introduced in 2006. Currently, the DSF is being implemented in 53 Upazila Health
Complexes (UHCs) (sub-district level public-sector health facilities). The DSF, with funding from the
GoB pool fund, targets the poor with a cash incentive of Taka 2,000 (US$25) for having an assisted
safe delivery, either in facilities or at home with a skilled birth attendant (SBA). Payees are also
entitled to transportation cost of Taka 500 ($6.25), from home to the UHC, and an additional Taka
500 ($6.25) for referral to the District Hospital. In addition, a gift box of one sari, two baby attires,
two towels and baby-soap worth Taka 500 ($6.25) is provided to pregnant women. In seven of the
53 UHCs, the DSF is funded by UN partners; in these UHCs, the lump sum cash incentive of Taka
2,000 (US$25) has been discarded and transportation costs are reimbursed for actual expenditures.
The DSF also offers incentives to providers based on service volume, varying according to type of
service. Amounts equal to those paid to providers are deposited in the seed fund, from which
associated expendable costs are paid. Thus, the DSF for maternal health care in Bangladesh is a
combination of supply-side incentives for providers and demand-side cash transfers for clients. A
recent evaluation of the DSF revealed increased service use among the target group although with
little impact on service quality, misreporting of safe delivery services for financial gain, complex
management arrangements, delays in fund disbursement through banks, and unofficial charges
from providers (Schmidt et al. 2010; Koehlmoos et al. 2008).
In this context, the Council explored possibilities of introducing the Pay-for-Performance or P4P
scheme to improve maternal health care services by using a consultative process in a series of
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workshops, funded by the AusAID through Center for Global Development. The government and nongovernmental health service providers, program managers and policymakers overwhelmingly
supported introduction of the P4P incentive for MNCH service providers in Bangladesh (Population
Council 2009).
Based on the study findings and consultative process, the Council collaborated with UNICEF for
providing technical assistance to the DGHS to test P4P strategies for MNCH service providers to
improve service volume and quality of care, and for the poor clients to receive services through
subsidized vouchers or coupons. Using a pre-test post-test separate sample quasi-experimental
design, the study tests two strategies. The first strategy is a combination of pay-for-performance
incentive for providers and subsidized coupons for poor pregnant women, newborns, and under-five
children, while the second strategy employs only pay-for-performance incentive for the providers.
The P4P approaches are different from the DSF scheme. Firstly, P4P approaches measure the facility
performance not individual provider’s performance. Secondly, quality of care in providing EmONC
services is measured and rewarded under the P4P scheme but this important aspect has not been
included under the DSF scheme. Thirdly, poor pregnant women receive coupons under the P4P
scheme irrespective of their number of parity while DSF scheme provides vouchers to the poor
pregnant women who have less than two children, which is a violation of women’s reproductive
health rights. Fourthly, P4P approaches allow poor pregnant women as well as their newborns and
under-five children to receive pregnancy, newborn and under-five children’s complications related
services. In contrast, DSF scheme allows vouchers for receiving pregnancy related services only.
Fifthly, P4P scheme employed a third party (non-governmental institution) to manage the incentive
disbursement to the facilities while the payer and the payees are the government under the DSF
scheme. Finally, coupon and service validation is made by an independent audit firm under the P4P
scheme while no such validation system is in place for the DSF scheme.

OBJECTIVES
The objective of the study is to test and compare the two service delivery models on utilization of
facility-based delivery, antenatal, postnatal and neonatal care services, and under-five children’s lifethreatening health care services to contribute to improve the maternal, newborn and child health 1.
The specific objectives are to:
x

test the feasibility of implementing performance incentives for providers, and clients;

x

evaluate whether payment for providers, with or without financing for clients, results in
increased utilization of antenatal care, postnatal care, institutional deliveries, and family
planning counseling.

1Initially,

the project aimed to increase the pregnancy-related complications management, newborn care and complications
management, and use of facility-based care for life-threatening but preventable diseases of under-five children. However,
the stakeholders could not agree on setting targets for complications management on ethical grounds.
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STUDY DESIGN
The study employed a separate sample pre-test post-test design with three arms: one comparison
and two intervention arms (Figure 1). Two strategies denoted as X1 and X2 are employed in the
intervention arms for 14 months, while the comparison group is unexposed to any P4P-related
intervention activities. The first strategy is a combination of the pay-for-performance for facility-based
providers and subsidized coupon for poor clients while the second strategy employs only the pay-forperformance incentives for facility-based providers. For being nested within the existing GoB-UN
MNCH and MNH projects, the community awareness activities coordinated by the NGO partners,
BRAC and CARE Bangladesh, and the health facility strengthening activities through local level
planning by UNICEF, remained constant across all the study sites.
For the supply side, conditional performance incentives are provided to the facility, which includes
managers, direct and indirect providers related to MNCH services, and relevant administrative and
support staff. Quarterly targets are set for the facility as a whole, which take into account both
quantity and quality of services. The Quality Assurance Group (QAG), consisting of specialists from
the nearby higher-level hospital (Medical College Hospital or District Hospital) and a professional
body, determines performance targets, performance achievements, and level of incentive payment
through their quarterly visits. Facilities formed Quality Assurance Teams (QATs) to establish an
internal monitoring mechanism.
Figure 1. P4P study design

Note: X1 and X2 represent intervention activities corresponding to strategies one and two, respectively. O1 to O3 refer to
observations from the pre-intervention surveys with the poor pregnant women and service providers. Terms O4 to O6 refer
to observations from the post-intervention surveys.

In order to mitigate the demand-side challenges, poor pregnant women and newborns and under-five
children of poor mothers received financial assistance to meet the costs of transportation, medicines
and other incidental costs for receiving antenatal care, institutional delivery, delivery-related
complications management, postnatal care, and complications management for newborns and
under five children.
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Comparison between the control and each intervention group and over time allows measuring the
effectiveness of the intervention strategies. Comparison between the two strategies allows
measuring the relative effectiveness of the two financing models in terms of changes attributable to
each program intervention. Given the resource constraints for this study, comparison of
effectiveness between the two strategies can better inform the policymakers to choose the more
effective strategy. In case both the strategies indicate positive results, both of them can be applied
in different settings according to the need. For instance, the first strategy can be applied in the
poorest regions while the second strategy can be applied in the poorer regions of the country where
the clients need less support to access the MNCH services.

STUDY SITES
Figure 2. Study sites according to strategies

Table 1. Selected facilities under the P4P project according to study arms
Gaibandha

Strategy I
Kurigram

Strategy II
Jamalpur

Comparison
Thakurgaon

1. Gaibandha District

2. Kurigram

3. Jamalpur

4. Thakurgaon

Hospital
5. Sunderganj UHC
9. Fulchari UHC

District Hospital
6. Nageswari UHC
10. Bhurungamari
UHC
14. Chilmari UHC

District Hospital
7. Islampur UHC
11. Melandah UHC

8. Baliadangi UHC*

15. Bakshiganj UHC

16. Ranisankoil UHC

13. Shaghata UHC

District Hospital
12. Pirganj UHC

Note: Facilities with serial numbers 1 to 8 were selected as comprehensive emergency obstetric and newborn care
(CEmONC) facilities, and the remaining facilities were selected as basic emergency obstetric and newborn care (BEmONC)
facilities. UHC stands for Upazila Health Complex or sub-district hospital.
Baliadangi UHC of Thakurgaon district was excluded due to initiation of the DSF program in 2011. Since there was no
other CEmONC facility available in Thakurgaon district to replace the facility at Baliadangi, the study activities were limited
to the remaining 15 facilities.
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ACTIVITIES
PREPARATORY ACTIVITIES
DESIGNING AND CONSENSUS-BUILDING WORKSHOPS

In order to design intervention activities and build consensus among the stakeholders, one national
and four district level workshops were held in March through August 2010, wherein a total of 294
participants, including policymakers, program managers, researchers, and other stakeholders from
government, development partners and non-government organizations actively participated. The
workshops enabled the DGHS to develop guidelines for implementing incentives to providers and
poor clients, and to form P4P and/or Coupon Committees for leading and managing the
implementation of activities as well as Quality Assurance Groups for facility accreditation and
performance measurement. The models of incentive payments for the facility-based providers and
the coupon clients are depicted in Figures 3 and 4, respectively.
Model of incentive payment to the facility-based providers
The key implementers of the provider incentive payment model include the DGHS as the regulator,
the facility MNCH team as the providers, Population Council as the payment administrator, the QAG
as the monitor to measure performance in terms of quality of care, and an independent audit firm to
validate service volume reported by the facilities. The DGHS issued guidelines, following which the
intervention health facilities formed a P4P Committee which, in turn, identified their MNCH team
responsible to provide services and receive the incentive payments. Upon receiving an invitation
from the P4P Committee, the QAG visited each facility to accredit the facility and set benchmark and
performance targets in discussion with the P4P Committee and the MNCH teams. The facilities and
the Council signed a contract allowing them to receive funds that could be paid as incentives to
individual providers, if the facility achieved the targets.
The quantitative targets are set at two levels of incentive payments. The first level of target is set at
twenty percent above the benchmark level, while the second level of target is set a further 20
percent above the first level of target. The targets are set on a quarterly basis, and the initial
benchmark is based on the individual facility’s past year’s performance. The targets are set for
antenatal care, family planning counseling, safe institutional delivery, and postnatal care services.
The qualitative targets are set for the relevant MNCH service units including the emergency room,
antenatal care and family planning corner, obstetrics room, labor room, operation theater, pediatrics
ward, store, pharmacy, laboratory, scrub room and autoclave room. A weighted score on a onehundred point scale is used to measure the performance in terms of quality of care. The indicators
for which facility cannot be held entirely responsible have less weight while the important MNCH
indicators for which the facility can be held responsible have higher weight. For instance, human
resource availability related indicators hold weight 0.5 while the signal functions on managing
EmONC complications for pregnant women, newborn and under-five children have weight 2. The total
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weighted scores of all the MNCH service units are transformed into a 100-point scale for comparison
with the previous quarter.
The facility MNCH team that is eligible to receive incentives includes the managers, direct and
indirect providers, administrative and support staff at varying level of efforts. The level of effort of
managers and direct providers is considered 100 percent, and is 50 percent for the indirect
providers and administrative staff, while for the support staff it ranges from 50 to 100 percent. The
first level of incentive amount is equivalent to a person’s one-month basic salary for a quarter; and
the second level of incentive equals one and a half month’s basic salary of the respective providers.
Figure 3. Incentive payment mechanism for the facility-based providers under the P4P scheme

Upon receiving the target, the MNCH team attempts to improve the service volume and the quality of
care. They engage the internal quality assurance teams to enhance the quality of care. At the end of
the quarter, the QAGs visit the facilities to measure the quality of care following an agreed upon
checklist. Upon reviewing the facility’s performance, the QAG recommends either rewarding the
facility with incentives for the providers or not recommending any incentive due to a lack of
improvement in performance. If a facility achieves both the volume and quality targets, then they
become eligible to receive performance incentives. Achieving only the quantitative target does not
allow a facility to receive the incentive. For the first level of incentive, the facility must meet the first
level of qualitative target coupled with at least the first level of quantitative target; and for the
second level of incentive, facilities must meet the second level of qualitative target along with the
second level of quantitative target.
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The P4P Committees receive an advance payment from the Council to pay incentives to the
providers by bank transfers. An audit firm, engaged by the Council, validates the payment made to
the providers, and service volume reported by the facilities.
Model of incentive payment to the coupon holders
The key actors for the model of incentive payment for the coupon clients include the DGHS as the
regulator, the eligible pregnant women and mothers of the newborns and under five children as
beneficiaries of the MNCH services from the enlisted facilities, the health facilities as the service
providers, the Population Council as the financial administrator, the Union Family Planning
Committees as monitors of proper identification of eligible coupon recipients, an independent audit
firm to validate the incentive payment, and the government fieldworkers as the distributors and
marketers of the coupon.
There are five key steps in this model: (i) orienting the service providers, fieldworkers and the
community leaders so that they can make the community aware of the services available through the
coupons; (ii) identification of the coupon recipients; (iii) distribution of the coupons, and motivation of
the coupon holders to utilize the coupon by informing the services available for coupons; (iv)
payment of coupon incentives in terms of services, medicines, transportation cost, diagnostic
services, and incidental costs; and (v) validation of selection of the coupon card holders and
payments made for using the coupons.
Figure 4. Incentive payment mechanism for the coupon clients under the P4P scheme
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Coupon cards cover four types of expenses incurred by clients: (a) transportation costs (Taka 500
(US$6.25) for 4 antenatal and a post-natal care visits, and Taka 300-700 (US$3.75-8.75) for regular
to urgent institutional delivery and complications care for mothers, newborns and children; (b) costs
of the medicines that are not available in the facilities, as needed; (c) diagnostic costs, as needed;
and (d) incidental costs of Taka 100 (US$1.25) per night for a maximum 5 nights for hospitalization.
The consultation is free of cost at all the public facilities except for the DH, which charges a nominal
outdoor fee of Taka 5 (US$0.06).
Nine services are available against coupon for pregnant women: four antenatal care consultations,
treatment for one pregnancy complication, one delivery at the facility, one postnatal care
consultation, one postnatal complication treatment, and one postnatal complication follow-up. In
addition, both newborns and under-five children are eligible to receive free treatment for one
complication, and a complication follow-up visit. Thus, a total of 13 services are available for each
package of coupons. The same coupon card is used for receiving multiple services to help the clients
tracking the relevant MNCH services.
Eligibility criteria for women to receive a coupon include: i) monthly family income of less than Taka
4,000 (US$50); ii) ownership of less than 15 decimals of land; and iii) not having any income
generating assets. These eligibility criteria are similar to that of the DSF model except for a lower
level for monthly income (Taka 2,500). The DSF model also excludes women who have more than
two children while no such criterion is used for the P4P project on ethical grounds.
The fieldworkers prepare lists of eligible women based on their pregnant women’s list and through
administering the poverty tool following the eligibility criteria. The Union Family Planning Committees
validate the list of coupon recipients while the P4P and Coupon committee further validates and
endorses the list. The newborns and under-five children of the eligible women automatically become
eligible for receiving the services. Fieldworkers distribute the coupons while the facilities provide
consultation and diagnostic services at free of cost, medicines in kind and make payments for the
incidental and transportation costs.
DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLICATION OF GUIDELINES AND MANUAL

Through an interactive consultation process, the Council developed and published four guidelines
and a manual for facilitating, requesting, and utilizing P4P incentives and coupon funds. The
guidelines on pay-for-performance incentives, forming P4P and/or Coupon Committees and QAGs,
and providing coupons for eligible clients were approved by the DGHS in early October 2010. The
guidelines describe technical aspects, while the manual depicts financial procedures for incentive
distribution. In addition, a Guideline on Maternal and Perinatal Death Review for Gaibandha and
Kurigram districts was developed in September 2011 following similar work done by the Center for
Injury Prevention and Research in Bangladesh (CIPRB) for Thakurgaon district.
DEVELOPMENT OF BCC MATERIALS

In collaboration with partners, the Council developed brochures on (a) P4P project activities, (b)
referrals for MNCH complication management, and (c) the coupon mechanism (Figure 5). The first
brochure gives an overview of the project, while the second and the third brochures provide
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important information on coupon and referral mechanisms, distribution, and utilization. The coupon
cards also portray important awareness-raising information and a list of the enlisted facilities.
Figure 5. Brochures on the P4P project, MNCH referrals and coupon mechanism

FORMATION AND ORIENTATION OF QAGS

Quality Assurance Groups, the external monitoring teams, were formed for the 12 intervention
facilities to measure the facility performance every three months. The QAGs for the District Hospitals
and comprehensive EmONC UHCs were formed with three experts from Rangpur and Mymensingh
Medical Colleges, and a regional expert of the Obstetrical and Gynaecological Society of Bangladesh
(OGSB). An obstetrician and a pediatrician of the District Hospital formed the QAGs for the basic
EmONC UHCs of the respective district. At least one member from the Council and/or the James P.
Grant School of Public Health joined the experts to facilitate their measurement activities. Two
workshops were organized for orienting members of the 12 QAGs about their visit objectives and
members’ roles in August 2010. Workshops chaired by the principals of the Rangpur and
Mymensingh Medical Colleges encouraged active discussions to generate feedback. The Director of
Primary Health Care and Line Director, Essential Service Delivery, DGHS underscored the need for
developing unit-based Quality Assurance Teams within the facility for sustaining the quality of care.
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FACILITY ACCREDITATION VISITS

Facilities hosted QAG visits in September 2010 for getting accreditation and to determine
benchmarks and set the first and second levels of target for the first quarter. Facilities of Gaibandha
organized the visits in November and December; therefore, the targets, performance and incentives
for these facilities were set and measured according to the month of the visit. The QAGs gave instant
feedback to the providers and the internal quality assurance teams while visiting the facility, and
mentored them to improve the quality of care. The visits ended with an interactive discussion with
the P4P Committees in order to set the benchmarks and targets for the first quarter. All the facilities
received accreditation, but one facility was downgraded as a basic instead of a comprehensive
EmONC care facility 2.
FORMATION OF FACILITY-BASED COMMITTEES AND TEAMS

In order to make the performance incentive functional, the facilities formed P4P and/or Coupon
Committees, MNCH teams, quality assurance teams, fund operation teams, and community based
referral teams.
P4P and/or Coupon Committees: To lead and manage the project implementation activities, sixmember P4P and/or Coupon Committees, headed by the Civil Surgeons/Upazila Health and Family
Planning Officers were formed. The Committees for District Hospital include the Resident Medical
Officer as the member-secretary and the President of the local branch of the Bangladesh Medical
Association, Deputy Director of Family Planning, an NGO representative and Nursing Supervisor as
committee members. For Upazila Health Complex, the Committees had Resident Medical Officer as
the member-secretary and an NGO representative, elected female local government representative,
Upazila Family Planning Officer and Nursing Supervisor as committee members. The Committee is
known as the P4P Committee for facilities implementing performance incentives for providers only.
The Committee members meet to review the performance and take necessary measures to improve
the situation, to arrange the QAG visits and to receive and utilize funds for distributing incentives to
the providers, and incur expenses for drugs, consumables, and maintenance activities. In addition,
the P4P and Coupon Committees are responsible for making payment to the coupon holders for
transportation and incidental costs, acquire drugs, and sign contract with diagnostic facilities in case
the service is not available within their facility.
MNCH Teams: The P4P Committees aligned the MNCH teams, including managers, direct and
indirect providers, and administrative and support staff for providing services and receiving
performance-based incentives. Numbers of team members in District Hospitals varied from 50 to 84
(lowest in Gaibandha, a 100-bed hospital and highest in Jamalpur, a 250-bed hospital), while
members varied from 40 to 51 in UHCs.
Quality Assurance Teams: Facilities formed QATs to ensure the quality of care at important MNCH
units to enable the institutions to bring about changes from within (Table 2). Monitoring tools in
Bangla posted on the walls allowed the QAT team leaders to monitor and record the performance of

2The comprehensive EmONC facilities offer the WHO prescribed nine signal functions while the basic facilities are unable to
offer cesarean section and blood transfusion services.
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their respective units twice a month. The Resident Medical Officer and Civil Surgeon/Upazila Health
and Family Planning Officer monitored the units at least once a month, and recorded their
observations and suggestions on the tool. The QAGs mentored the QATs and measured their
performance during quarterly visits, because internal quality assurance is an important aspect to
improve and sustain the facility performance.
Table 2. List of Quality Assurance Teams across type of facilities
District Hospital

Comprehensive EmONC UHC

Basic EmONC UHC

x Emergency room

x Emergency room

x Emergency room

x Autoclave/sterilization room

x Autoclave/sterilization room

x Autoclave/sterilization room

x Pharmacy

x Pharmacy

x Pharmacy

x Store

x Store

x Store

x Laboratory/pathology

x Laboratory/pathology

x Laboratory/pathology

x Labor room

x Labor room

x Labor room

x Obstetrics ward

x Obstetrics ward/ Female ward

x Obstetrics ward/ Female ward

x Antenatal care, postnatal
care and family planning
corner

x Antenatal care, postnatal care
and family planning cornerDGHS

x Antenatal care, postnatal care
and family planning cornerDGHS

x Pediatrics and sick newborn
ward(s)

x Antenatal care, postnatal care
and family planning cornerDGFP

x Antenatal care, postnatal care
and family planning cornerDGFP

x Female ward (under-five
children)

x Female ward (under-five
children)

x Operation theatre

x Operation theatre

Referral Teams: Union 3 based referral teams were formed with a total of 1,484 fieldworkers for
making referrals for MNCH patients with complications in exchange for a nominal referral incentive.
The referees included the government fieldworkers and NGO workers. The referees received Taka 50
(US$0.63) for each successful referral. The amount was later raised to Taka 150 (US$1.88) in order
to reduce the gap with a similar incentive offered by BRAC.
Fund Operation Teams: Fund operation teams were formed to receive funds, incur expenses and
settle an advance with the Council following the approved guidelines, financial mechanism manual,
and standard accounting procedures. The team consists of the Civil Surgeon/ Upazila Health and
Family Planning Officer, Resident Medical Officer, Head Assistant, and Cashier. Fund operation team
members are entitled to receive an incentive tied with the overall facility performance.

3Union

is immediate lower administrative tier to Upazila (sub-district); about 6-10 unions form a Upazila.
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TEAM-BUILDING WORKSHOPS

Twenty-four team building-workshops with 579 facility-based managers, direct and indirect
providers, and administrative and support staff were organized in August and September 2010. Not
to disrupt services, two workshops for each facility were arranged on facility premises. The
workshops aimed to revitalize the team spirit among MNCH team members by discussing present
barriers and motivating staff to be team players for attaining facility targets. The James P. Grant
School of Public Health designed, developed and facilitated the workshops with inputs from the
project partners.
ORIENTATION WORKSHOPS WITH FIELDWORKERS

Orientation workshops with 1,065 fieldworkers (Health Assistants, Family Welfare Assistants, and
NGO workers) were organized in October and December 2010 in nine Upazilas. The workshops
oriented fieldworkers on (a) the P4P project, (b) MNCH referral, and (c) the coupon mechanism. The
objectives were to enable fieldworkers to work in harmony for strengthening the referral mechanism
and to identify poor pregnant women for coupon distribution and motivating them to use the
coupons for receiving MNCH services.
Considering gaps in the community awareness level, 270 NGO fieldworkers were oriented in nine
workshops, one in each upazila, in 2011. The fieldworkers received information to enable them to
orient about 2,500 frontline NGO volunteers living in the community, on timely referring the
complicated MNCH patients to relevant facilities, and to increase the service uptake for coupon
holders.
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT WORKSHOP AND SIGNING OF CONTRACTS

Financial management workshops with fund operation teams were organized to orient and build
facility capacity for managing incentive funds for providers and patients following the Financial
Manual and P4P Guidelines. All the facilities held the workshop in 2010 except for Fulchari Upazila
Health Complex, which organized the event in January 2011. The fund operation team included the
Civil Surgeon/Upazila Health and Family Planning Officer, Resident Medical Officer, and
administrative personnel maintaining accounts and records, making payments, keeping stores, and
providing medicines or diagnostic services to clients. Following the financial management
workshops, all facilities signed agreements with the Council and opened P4P and/or Coupon
Committee bank accounts. The contracts were signed by December 2010 except for Fulchari which
was signed in March 2011. Due to transfer of managerial officers who are the bank account
signatories, three facilities of Gaibandha opened bank accounts in January through March 2011
while others opened their accounts in 2010.
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INTERVENTION ACTIVITIES
QAG PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT VISITS

Facilities hosted the QAG visits in January, April, July, October and December 2011 for quarterly
performance assessments. During the visits, the QAG members—obstetricians, pediatricians, and
anesthetists—identified gaps in service delivery and mentored the QAT members. They also
discussed quality of care issues at length with the P4P Committees and the QATs. The providers
were refreshed on use of partograph, eclampsia, haemorrhage management, active management of
third stage of labor, breastfeeding, severe
dehydration management, newborn
Photo 1. An impromptu session by a QAG member
resuscitation, birth asphyxia, and acute
on nebulizer use in the female ward of a facility
respiratory infection management as well as
infection prevention and waste management
measures.
In addition, lab technicians were advised to
provide timely indent reports using the register
instead of loose sheets; pharmacists were
advised to keep last stock balances updated;
and store keepers were supported to keep
separate and updated registers for emergency
and labor rooms, obstetric ward, operation
theatre, and pediatric ward to avoid delays in
medical interventions. In addition, QAGs suggested posting duty rosters for providers on the wall, as
well as notices on the prohibition of monetary transactions, and keeping registers identifying “high
risk” pregnant women for follow-up services.
Facilities lacked adequate protocols and behavior change communication materials. Activating the
MNCH Committees to ensure the local level planning, and making the Death Review Committees
functional were recommended for improving service quantity and quality. In spite of human resource
and logistic-related constraints, facilities attempted to improve MNCH services by better utilizing the
existing resources.
TRAINING FOR FACILITY-BASED PROVIDERS

Due to demand identified during the repeated QAG visits and recommendations made by the
experts, the facilities organized refresher training for nurses on the partograph, active management
of third stage of labor, newborn care, and infection prevention in Gaibandha, Kurigram and Jamalpur
district facilities in August through October 2011. Assistant Professors from Medical Colleges visited
the District Hospital while the experts from the District Hospital visited UHCs to conduct the training.
COUPON CLIENT SELECTION, COUPON DISTRIBUTION AND UTILIZATION

In order to identify poor pregnant women for coupon card distribution, 188 and 235 government
fieldworkers were engaged in Gaibandha and Kurigram, respectively, from January to September
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2011. Gaibandha engaged only Family Welfare Assistants while Kurigram engaged equal numbers of
Family Welfare Assistants and Health Assistants. Lists prepared by the government fieldworkers were
verified by the Union Family Planning Committee, and later approved by the respective facility-level
P4P and Coupon Committees.
Table 3. Identification, selection and coupon card distribution among the poor pregnant women
Upazila Health

Number

Total pregnant women

Pregnant women

Coupon card

Complexes

of unions

identified

identified as eligible to

distribution

receive coupons
Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Kurigram
Nageswari

15

6,924

58

5,590

59

4,284

53

Bhurungamari

10

2,584

22

1,812

19

1,812

22

Chilmari

6

2,320

20

2,059

22

2,059

25

Sub-total

31

11,828

100

9,461

100

8,155

100

Identified as poor for receiving coupon out of total pregnant women in Kurigram

80%

Coupon distribution out of total identified poor pregnant women in Kurigram

86%

Gaibandha
Sunderganj

15

3,900

43

3,059

45

3,059

45

Shaghata

10

3,071

34

2,488

37

2,488

37

Fulchari

7

2,034

23

1,259

18

1,259

18

Sub-total

32

9,005

100

6,806

100

6,806

Identified as poor for receiving coupon out of total pregnant women in Gaibandha
Coupon distribution out of total identified poor pregnant women in Gaibandha
Total

63

20,833

16
6,267

100
76%
100%

14,9
961

Identified as poor for receiving coupon out of total pregnant women

78%

Coupon distribution out of total identified poor pregnant women

92%

Three-fourths of the poor pregnant women were identified as eligible for coupon distribution; and of
them, 92 percent received coupons from the government fieldworkers (Table 3). Although half of the
pregnant women were initially thought to become eligible for a coupon, the proportion of eligible
women turned out to be as high as 78 percent, primarily because these are poor communities.
Coupon card distribution started in January and February 2011 in Kurigram but was delayed in
Gaibandha until March 2011. Gaibandha District Hospital could not start financial operations
because its Civil Surgeon In-Charge did not have the financial authority. Another batch of coupon
cards was distributed from April to July 2011.
Coupons were distributed only among the 77 percent of the eligible poor pregnant women in
Nageswari of Kurigram due to unavailability of willing and active fieldworkers. In Gaibandha, coupons
were distributed using NGO workers in the case of unavailability of the government workers, but this
was not entirely possible in Kurigram because the NGO operation is relatively recent in the area.
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Due to poor utilization rates of coupon beneficiaries, 284 fieldworkers were oriented and engaged
for coupon promotion and validation of the coupon distribution activities in Gaibandha and Kurigram
districts, in September 2011. Gaibandha employed only the NGO workers, including BRAC Shasthyo
Shebikas (health volunteers) and Friendship NGO workers while Kurigram engaged a few Health
Assistants in Nageswari and Chilmari upazilas.
VALIDATION OF COUPON DISTRIBUTION

Three-fifths of the total 14,961 coupon card holders were interviewed in order to validate the coupon
card distribution, and to know about the utilization and reasons for non-use. About 88 percent
(n=4060) in Gaibandha and 72 percent (n=3057) coupon card holders in Kurigram reported
receiving the coupons. The others either damaged or lost the cards or did not receive the cards from
the workers.
Coupons were utilized mostly for receiving the antenatal care services (79 percent) followed by
institutional delivery, postnatal care, and pregnancy complications care. About one in ten users used
coupon for receiving neonatal and under five complication related services (Table 4).
Table 4. Service recipients using coupon cards by type of services under the strategy I

U5
complication

Neonatal
complication

Pregnancy
complication

Delivery care

Type of services received(percent)

PNC

Received
services
against coupon
(%)
ANC

Sites

Gaibandha
n

40
1624

74
1197

17
268

15
237

14
226

9
150

10
155

Kurigram
n

60
1848

84
1554

16
290

19
355

12
222

9
162

8
154

49

79
2751

16
558

17
592

13
448

9
312

9
309

Total
n

3472

The most cited reasons for non-use of coupon is inadequate knowledge about the coupon (41
percent) followed by not perceiving the need to receive services from the health facilities (22
percent), long distance and poor transportation facility (9 percent) and delay in receiving the coupon
(8 percent). The challenges of transportation remained a reality in some places in spite of offering
the transportation costs reimbursement through the coupon. Travelling to the facilities involving
multiple vehicles including rickshaw, auto-rickshaw, boat, and bus from the remote char unions is
cumbersome; and the transportation cost offered was not adequate for round-trip transportation to
the facilities (Figure 6).
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Figure 6. Remote unions of Nageswari Upazila Health Complex of Kurigram district

Nageswari
UHC

Figure credit. Md. Julkarnayeen, Population Council.

INCENTIVE GUIDELINES AMENDMENT

Pursuant to experience from the facilities, the DGHS amended the P4P incentive guideline for
providers in February 2011. Major changes involved the inclusion of Medical Officer-Civil Surgeon,
Senior Family Welfare Visitor (FWV), Junior Consultant (Pediatrics), Operation Theatre Boy
(Attendant), Sterilizer Operator, and Ward Master in the incentive package. Medical Officer-Civil
Surgeon was included for ensuring smooth communication among facilities and providers, and
Senior FWV was included for providing family planning services in District Hospitals, while others had
been inadvertently not included in the original guidelines. Medical Technologist (Radiography) was
excluded from the MNCH team. Another amendment to the Guideline was made in August 2011,
which increased referral incentives for fieldworkers from Taka 50 to 150 (US$0.63 to 0.1.88),
because BRAC, in the same area, provides Taka 150 for assisting home delivery while referral under
the P4P allowed only Taka 50.
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REVIEW MEETING WITH NGO PARTNERS

A review meeting with UNICEF and NGO partners, BRAC and CARE Bangladesh, was held in Dhaka in
April 2011. As BRAC also incentivizes poor clients, participants discussed how to avoid duplication,
as well as coupon distribution, the referral system, and NGO worker orientation. Considering the
insufficiency of one-way transportation cost reimbursement, it was decided that a coupon beneficiary
who is also a BRAC beneficiary will be reimbursed from both BRAC and P4P project in order to help
her covering the round-trip transportation cost. BRAC staff will ensure that there is no duplication in
providing medicines free of cost to such clients. BRAC is unable to reach all the poor clients with the
full benefit due to fund limitation; therefore, the P4P and BRAC initiatives are complementary and
not wastage of the resources. Since P4P study tests supply-side versus demand-plus-supply-side
approaches, subsidies by both BRAC and P4P will not affect the P4P study design, although added
advantage of client incentives will not be separately attributable to either BRAC’s MNCH or the P4P
project.
FACILITY FUND MANAGEMENT

The 12 facilities under the Arms 1 and 2 spent US$432,913 from October 2010 to November 2011.
This amount represents the incremental expenditures incurred in addition to the usual government
and UNICEF funding. Since no incremental cost has been incurred, the comparison facility costs
have not been analyzed. To help settle advance funds, the Council arranged and paid for training
and on-the-job training. The trainers visited all the three districts to train and help facilities in fund
disbursement upon expense incurred. An audit firm verified the facility expense reports before
liquidation. Eight facilities of strategy I and four facilities of strategy II spent $262,495 (61 percent)
and $170,418 (39 percent), respectively. On average, each facility under strategy I spent $32,812
while each facility under strategy II spent $42,605 over the 14-month intervention period. The total
average expenditures of the strategy II facilities are higher because the facilities spent from about
one and a half times to twice the amount spent for incentive payments to the providers, referral
incentives payments to the fieldworkers, and for purchasing supplies, consumables and
maintenance.
Facilities across both the strategies spent most of the total expenditures to pay incentives to the
providers (strategy I sites - 78 percent and strategy II sites - 95 percent) (Figure 7). Facilities of
strategies I and II spent almost the same proportions of the expenditures to pay referral fees to the
fieldworkers and for purchasing supplies, consumables and maintenance (Figure 7).
Strategy I facilities spent about one-fifth of the total expenditure for incentives to the coupon clients;
the highest proportion was spent for reimbursing transportation costs to the coupon clients (8
percent) followed by purchasing drugs (7 percent). The incidental and diagnostic costs registered the
lowest proportion of expenditures, because incidental costs are incurred only in case of
hospitalization while diagnostic costs are incurred only by the comprehensive health facilities.
Gaibandha District Hospital could not identify suitable diagnostic facilities and the CEmONC UHC of
Gaibandha turned into a basic EmONC UHC; therefore, these facilities failed to offer this benefit to
the coupon clients.
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Figure 7. Distribution of liquidated expenses according to the head of expenditure across strategies

VALIDATION OF INCENTIVE PAYMENT AND RECEIVING SERVICES FROM THE FACILITY

An audit firm investigated if the facilities correctly reported the number of clients of MNCH services,
and validated if the coupon clients received the intended benefits.
A total of 1,026 clients were selected from the facility registers; of them, 96 percent were available
for interview. All the clients reported receiving services from the facilities. Four-fifths of the
respondents reported receiving drugs; the rate was universal in Jamalpur (99 percent), followed by
Kurigram (84 percent) while over two-fifth participants in Gaibandha reported not receiving any
medicine. No clients reported receiving diagnostic services in Gaibandha and Jamalpur, and only 11
percent received them in Kurigram. All the facilities lagged behind in providing diagnostic services. In
spite of having incentive funding for providing diagnostic services, facilities under strategy I failed to
provide these important services to the clients. The UHCs are supposed to provide the diagnostic
services free of cost while the DHs realize expenses for providing this service. The CEmONC facilities
of strategy I sites were encouraged to sign contracts with outside facilities in order to provide the
sonography (ultrasonography) services. But only one out of the three CEmONC facilities signed a
contract with diagnostic service centers. The diagnostic service centers were non-cooperative over
the payment of value added tax (VAT), without which contracts could not be signed between the
facilities and diagnostic centers. Interestingly, the reported level of satisfaction with the services is
the highest in Gaibandha (92 percent) followed by Kurigram (75 percent), and Jamalpur (61
percent).
Ten percent of coupon clients (n=941) during April to September 2011 were randomly selected and
validated if they had had received the intended benefits. About two-thirds of the coupon clients
reported receiving medicines (three-fourth in Kurigram and about half in Gaibandha). Almost all the
coupon clients (95 percent) received the transportation cost but only one in ten reported receiving
the diagnostic cost. Overall, nine in 10 coupon clients reported satisfaction with the services.
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EVALUATION ACTIVITIES
FACILITY MIS

Facility based management information system (MIS) data have been collected from the 15 facilities
for 26 months, from October 2009 to November 2011. The MIS data have been extracted from the
monthly reports and registers maintained at the facilities. Council researchers collected the
information directly from the facilities in cooperation with the facility staff. District Coordinators
monitored the data collection and a Data Management Specialist collated and checked quality of the
data for consistency and accuracy. The MIS data on monthly performance have been the key to the
measurement of the quantitative targets pursued and achieved by the facilities, and for evaluating
the MNCH service delivery in terms of quantity across facilities and strategies. The facilities,
administered by the DGHS, do not usually record data on family planning counseling, therefore, a
form to record this information was developed, which was administered at all the study sites.
Strengthening the MIS may result in increasing the reporting and act as a confounder. In order to
avoid such bias, MIS support was provided to all the facilities at the same time. However, the data
collectors were not blinded because two data collectors per district had to be stationed at the district
level for continuous and multiple data collection activities who knew about the on-going facility
activities. However, they were part of the evaluation team, and remained detached from the
intervention activity facilitators.
QAG VISITS

The QAGs made five quarterly visits at the 12 facilities from October 2010 to December 2011. The
QAG members administered three types of QoC checklists appropriate for the District Hospitals,
UHCs providing comprehensive EmONC services, and UHCs providing or basic EmONC services. QAG
visits were not made at the comparison sites. Therefore, quality of care measured by the specialists
is compared only across the intervention districts and strategies.
PROVIDERS’ SURVEY

Separate samples of providers were interviewed for baseline (n=272) and endline surveys (n=201)
from the 15 facilities using a semi-structured questionnaire on motivation and problems faced in
carrying out the MNCH services (see Table 5). Survey participants included managers and direct
providers including the doctors, consultants and nurses. Data have been entered and analyzed using
the SPSS program. The samples are not significantly different, both between the three arms and over
time, except that more managers participated in the baseline survey at the strategy I facilities than in
strategy II sites; and more males participated in the end line relative to the baseline survey at the
comparison facilities than at the strategy I facilities (Table 5).
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Table 5. Characteristics of the interviewed providers across strategies and over time
Strategy I

Strategy II

Comparison

T0

T0

T0

T1

T1

T1

T0

T1

Percent

Position

Strategy II vs
Comparison

T0 T1

T0

2 value

18

16

9

11

17

26

23

26

34

35

21

34

59

58

57

55

62

40

Male

36

43

40

42

28

43

Female

64

57

60

58

72

57

Manager
Doctor/
consultant
Nurse/
Medical
Assistant/
FWV

Strategy I vs
Comparison

T1

T0 T1

Strategy I vs
Strategy II

T0

T1

T0 T1

(level of significance)

0.2
ns

3.9
ns

2.5
ns

4.2
ns

4.1
ns

3.1
ns

5.1
~

1.6
ns

0.2
ns

1.2
ns

0.0
ns

3.5
~

2.5
ns

0.0
ns

1.3
ns

0.5
ns

0.0
ns

1.1
ns

Sex

Age
Mean
Standard
deviation
Education
Mean
Standard
deviation
N

Years

F test value (level of significance)

41

41

40

40

42

41

9.2

9.3

8.9

8.5

9.1

9.6

15

15

16

15

15

16

1.9

2.1

2.3

2.1

2.4

1.7

99

79

55

58

47

135

0.1
ns

0.0
ns

0.2
ns

0.8
ns

0.4
ns

0.2
ns

0.6
ns

0.6
ns

0.2
ns

0.0
ns

1.9
ns

0.1
ns

1.2
ns

0.4
ns

0.0
ns

2.6
ns

0.5
ns

0.5
ns

~p<.1; ns- non-significant at p>0.05. T0- Baseline; T1- Endline; T0 -T1- Over time: Baseline versus Endline. FWVFamily Welfare Visitor
CLIENT EXIT INTERVIEWS

Client exit interviews were carried out at the 15 health facilities among the MNCH clients after
receiving services from May 2011 to November 2011 (Table 6). The client exit interviews were
carried out during the intervention period to measure the on-going quality of care of services. The
Council researchers conducted the interviews and entered data into an MS Access software after
cross checking and editing. Data were entered twice to ensure the quality. District Coordinators
monitored the data collection and a Data Management Specialist collated and checked quality of
data for consistency and accuracy. Exit client interview data have been analyzed using the SPSS
14.0 for Windows. The samples between both the strategy sites and the comparison sites are
significantly different in terms of religion, age and education of the respondents (Table 6). More
participants at the strategy II sites were Muslim followed by strategy I and comparison sites; the
samples differ also between the two strategy sites in terms of religion and husband’s education. The
comparison site respondents were younger, had fewer children, and had higher level of education
than that of the strategy I and II sites.
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Table 6. Characteristics of client exit interview respondents across arms

Characteristics

Strategy I

Religion
Islam

Comparison

92

97

88

Years

5.9*

Strategy II
vs
Comparison

Strategy I vs
Strategy II

(level of significance)
36.5***

20.3***

F test value (level of significance)

23.2

23.5

22.6

5.2

4.7

5.1

Mean

5.1

5.5

6.1

Standard deviation

3.6

3.9

3.7

Mean

4.4

5.6

5.4

Standard deviation

4.4

4.8

4.5

Mean

1.6

1.5

1.4

Standard deviation

1.2

1.0

1.1

1125

587

412

Standard deviation

Strategy I vs
Comparison
2 value

Percent

Age
Mean

Strategy II

1.96*

2.8**

1.2 (ns)

4.7***

2.6**

1.8~

4.1***

0.6 (ns)

5.1***

2.3*

0.9 (ns)

1.7~

Education

Husband’s education

Total children

N

***p<.00; **p<.01; *p<.05; ~p<.1; ns- non-significant at p>0.05. N is 2,124 except for husband’s education
for which the N is 2,097.

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS WITH THE CLIENTS

In-depth interviews were carried out with 270 women who received MNCH services during the
intervention period from the 15 facilities to learn about the contextual factors as well as the benefits
and the challenges that they encountered in receiving care from the facilities (Table 7). The samples
between the strategy I and II sites and the comparison sites are significantly different in terms of
respondents’ level of education, with respondents from strategy I sites having the lowest mean
number of years of education, while respondents at the comparison sites have higher levels of
education (Table 7).
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Table 7. Characteristics of in-depth interview respondents across arms
Fvalue
Characteristics

Strategy I

Strategy II

Comparison

Strategy I vs
Comparison

Strategy II
vs
Comparison

Strategy I vs
Strategy II

0.2 ns

0.9 ns

2.6 ns

14.9***

4.6*

1.7 ns

Age (years)
Mean

23.2

24.4

23.5

5.4

5.7

5.1

Mean

5.1

5.8

7.2

Standard deviation

3.5

3.9

3.4

144

69

57

Standard deviation
Education (years)

N

***p<.00; **p<.01; *p<.05; ~p<.1; ns- non-significant at p>0.05. N is 2,124 except for husband’s education
for which the N is 2,097.

RESULTS
Feasibility of implementing performance incentives for providers and clients is measured in terms of
operationalization of the incentive schemes, increased volume of services and improvement in
quality of care of the MNCH services at the intervention facilities. Comparison across strategies and
control sites indicates payment for providers, with or without financing for clients, results in
increased utilization of MNCH services including the antenatal care, postnatal care, institutional
deliveries, and family planning counseling.

CHANGES IN SERVICE VOLUME
The percentage change in service volume over time for institutional delivery at both the strategies I
and II facilities was significantly higher relative to the comparison facilities (Table Appendix A.1).
Antenatal and postnatal care volumes increased significantly at the strategy I facilities relative to the
comparison facilities. The benchmark levels of antenatal and postnatal services of strategy I facilities
were significantly lower relative to that of the comparison facilities, which may have contributed to
the significantly higher level of percentage changes in service volume of these services over time
across the strategy I facilities. The benchmark may have varied due to the differences in social
determinants, contextual factors, and level of functionality between the strategy I and comparison
site facilities.
The facilities of strategy I registered significantly higher changes in providing antenatal care,
postnatal care and institutional delivery services relative to the strategy II facilities although the
service volumes across the strategy I and II sites did not significantly vary before initiation of the
intervention activities.
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Figure 8. Percentage changes in maternal health service volumes over time across the three sites

On average, Upazila Health Complexes doubled the average number of institutional deliveries each
quarter at the intervention sites while the District Hospitals increased institutional deliveries by 38
percent (not shown). The Upazila Health Complexes at the intervention sites almost tripled and
quadrupled the average volume of antenatal and postnatal care services, respectively, while the
District Hospitals increased these services by 39 and 70 percentages, respectively (not shown).
The quarterly average performance of family planning counseling during the intervention period
between strategies I and II indicates better performance at the strategy II relative to the strategy I
site (602 vs 236, p= 0.07). Comparison between the first and the last quarter’s performance
revealed that the change was significant at the strategy I site, and non-significant at the strategy II
site. The family planning counseling service was not properly recorded at the comparison health
facilities making comparison between the intervention sites and the comparison site impossible.
However, it indicates the lesser priority attached to this service if the service is provided at all.
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CHANGE IN QUALITY OF CARE
The intervention facilities significantly increased quality of care of MNCH services over time
measured on a 100 point scale (Figure 9).
Figure 9. The change in overall quality of care score, and percent changes in the score related to
MNCH services across districts and strategies over time

***
***
***
***
**
**

***p<.001; **p<.01. Score measured on a 100 point scale.

The change was higher at the strategy I facilities relative to that of the strategy II facilities since the
benchmark scores of quality of care was significantly lower for strategy I facilities relative to the
strategy II facilities. The level of change was most striking in Kurigram (57 percent) followed by
Gaibandha (44 percent) and Jamalpur (28 percent) districts. Since the quality of care score was not
measured in the comparison facilities before and during the project period, no comparison across
the intervention and the comparison facilities can be made during this period. However, in a followup study, the difference between the scores was measured in which both the strategy I and strategy
II facilities achieved significantly higher scores relative to the comparison facilities in 2012.
The QoC score increased gradually from the average score of 54 out of 100, measured during the
facility accreditation visits in 2010, to 85 at the final quarter of 2012, which indicates that bringing
about changes in the quality of care is a time consuming process (Figure 10). Multivariate analysis
using the repeated measures procedure, modeling the quarterly QoC scores across districts
indicated a statistically significant effect of quarters on incentive-induced quality of care scores, F (5,
5) = 19.20, p<.003. There is an interaction between the districts and quarters (F(10, 12) = 2.78,
p<.048.) with Jamalpur district having higher score at the first quarter but ended at the same level
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as that of Kurigram in the following quarters. Kurigram district stood at the same level as that of
Gaibandha, but it outperformed the latter district in the successive quarters.
Figure 10. The change in overall quality of care score related to MNCH services over time

Changes were especially noticeable in the labor room, obstetrics ward, autoclave, and
antenatal/postnatal and family planning corner. Some of the most significant changes include:









Introducing ANC and PNC corners,
breastfeeding corners, and post-operative
room;
Separating the sick newborn care unit within
the pediatric ward of District Hospital;
Increasing labor room readiness and better
equipping it, with partograph maintenance,
installing toilets adjacent to the labor room,
and making sitting arrangements for
attendants;
Initiating better management of newborn
care with newborn resuscitation training;
Improving facility cleanliness; and
Separating un-sterile and sterile areas of the
autoclave room.

Photo 2. Labor room readiness enhanced with
functional spotlight, curtain and sterilized
equipment
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INCENTIVE LEVEL ACHIEVED
In terms of incentive level achievement, with minimum 0 and maximum 2 scores, strategy II facilities
consistently outperformed the strategy I facilities (p<0.01). Strategy I facilities gradually shifted from
low to high performance level of incentive achievement while achievement levels for the strategy II
facilities remained constant across the study period (Figure 11).
Figure 11. The change in the incentive level achievement across strategies over time

CLIENT SATISFACTION
Client exit and in-depth interviews measured the client satisfaction as well as challenges the clients
faced in receiving the services across the study arms. The overall satisfaction score was highest in
strategy I sites relative to both the strategy II and comparison sites after adjusting for age, years of
education, husband’s education, total number of children and religion. The background
characteristics were adjusted in order to account for the existing variability across the strategies. The
level of client satisfaction remained similar across the strategy II and the comparison sites (Table 8).
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Table 8. Mean and mean difference on client satisfaction with MNCH services across arms
Arm

Mean

Std. Error

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound
Upper Bound

Strategy-I

2.16

.07

2.02

2.31

Strategy-II

1.60

.18

1.26

1.95

Comparison

1.71

.10

1.51

1.91

Comparison
between arms
Strategy I versus
Comparison
Strategy II versus
Comparison
Strategy I versus
Strategy II

Mean
Difference
(significancea)

Std. Error

95% Confidence Interval for Difference
Lower Bound

Upper Bound

.13

.15

.75

.20

-.59

.38

.19

.100

1.01

.45*
(.001)
-.11
(1.00)
.56*
(.01)

* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. a Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.
F (9, 2087) = 13.66, p<.000. The model adjusted for age, education, total number of children, husband’s education and
religion.

The individual items on level of client satisfaction revealed that offering free-of-cost services and
medicines, and not requiring extra money
Photo 3. Maternal, newborn and child health coupon
have caused higher satisfaction level at the
card allowed poor clients better access to services
strategy I sites (Table 9). However, the
strategy II and the comparison facilities
performed better in terms of providers’
behavior relative to strategy I sites. The
client satisfaction level was significantly
lower at the strategy II sites relative to the
strategy I sites except for the satisfaction
that was reported due to providers’ good
behavior while the differences between the
strategy II sites and the comparison sites
were not significant.
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Table 9. Component of satisfaction with MNCH services across arms

Model 1: Providers
behave well
F (9, 2087) = 8.66,
p < .000.

Model 2:
Treatment is good
F (9, 2087) = 2.25,
p < .017.

Model 3:
Free service
F (9, 2087) = 5.9, p
< .000.

Model 4:
Free medicine
F (9, 2087) = 40.28,
p < .000.

Model 5:
No need to pay
extra money
F (9, 2087) = 17.40,
p < .000.

Mean
Standard
error
Mean
Standard
error
Mean
Standard
error

Strategy I

Strategy II

Comparison

Strategy I
Strategy II Strategy I
versus
versus
versus
Comparison Comparison Strategy II
Mean difference (significance)

0.29

0.51

0.48

-0.19*

0.03

-0.22*

0.03

0.06

0.04

0.05

0.07

0.07

0.85

0.79

0.79

0.06

0.00

0.06

0.02

0.05

0.03

0.04

0.06

0.05

0.27

0.17

0.14

0.13*

0.03

0.10

0.02

0.06

0.03

0.04

0.06

0.06

Mean
Standard
error

0.37

0.06

0.16

0.20*

-0.11

0.31*

0.02

0.05

0.03

0.04

0.06

0.05

Mean

0.20

0.01

0.08

0.12*

-0.07

0.19*

Standard
error

0.02

0.04

0.03

0.03

0.05

0.05

* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. a Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.
The models have been adjusted for age, education, total number of children, husband’s education and religion.

In-depth interviews with respondents reported several advantages and constraints faced in the
facilities (Table 10). Similar to the findings of client exit interviews, behavior of the doctors, nurses
and other service providers is better at the strategy II and comparison sites relative to strategy I
sites. Receiving free treatment and drugs caused higher satisfaction at the intervention sites relative
to the comparison sites. However, the comparison sites performed better than the intervention
facilities in terms of providing advice on complications during pregnancy, and the regular visits made
by the doctors and nurses (Table 10).Thus, the financial incentives paid to the providers did not
affect their behavior towards the clients at the strategy I sites, and the providers’ behavior remained
the same across strategy II and comparison sites.
Receiving services and medicines at free of cost can greatly impact upon the satisfaction level of the
clients, which is illustrated in case studies 1 and 2. The case study 2 further revealed why providing
transportation and other costs may not automatically induce the pregnant women to deliver at the
facilities.
The challenges reported at the comparison sites included not providing free of cost services,
medicines and financial incentives, having the long waiting hours, not providing advice on family
planning, not maintaining privacy during physical examination, not supplying food, and extra
payments that are to be made to the ayas (support staff-nurse aides). Overall, one-fifth of the
respondents reported ill behavior of the nurses as cause of dissatisfaction. Thus, the financial
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incentives paid to the providers had limited effect on the clients’ satisfaction with the quality of care
in terms of doctors and nurses’ visits and their behavior with the clients.
Table 10. Advantages and challenges faced in the facilities, as reported by in-depth interview
respondents across arms (in percent)
Advantages/challenges
AD
DVANTAGES
Doctors, nurses and other service providers
are well behaved
No problem occurred during admission or
service
Received advice on complications during
pregnancy/ child care/ vaccination
Doctors came regularly on visit
Received free treatment from the hospital
Privacy maintained during physical
examination
Nurse came regularly on visit
Some medicines are provided by the
hospital
Quality of service is pleasant
Patients do not have to wait long for
admission
Received advice on family planning/
demonstrated with apparatus
Hospital is clean
Financial incentive are provided

Strategy I

Strategy II

Strategies I &II

Comparison

64

75

70

79

53

42

48

46

42

36

39

51

39

43

41

47

82

78

80

4

40

41

40

42

37

19

28

47

68

28

48

19

41

36

39

30

0

17

9

37

15

9

12

32

4

0

2

37

37

0

19

0

CHALLENGES
Some medicines are not free
No advice given on newborn care, post
pregnancy complications and care

48

75

62

89

24

39

31

56

Patients have to wait to receive services

21

29

25

58

No advice offered on family planning

17

10

14

54

7

0

3

61

Do not provide information on coupon

26

91

59

0

Nurses/other providers are ill behaved
Privacy not maintained during physical
examination

18

17

18

19

7

4

6

25

5

3

4

23

Delivery performed by nurse

10

6

8

9

Hospital is not clean

13

1

7

9

No financial incentive is provided

Food not supplied from the hospital

Vehicle problem to reach the hospital

3

0

1

14

Ayas are to be paid extra money

3

1

2

12

Have to pay for physical examination

1

0

0

14

144

69

213

57

N
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Case study 1: Delivering a baby at a facility that provides quality of care
After having the first delivery at home, Nileema (fictitious name) got admitted to an Upazila
Health Complex facility for her second delivery. She has been coming to the facility to receive
antenatal care services since her early pregnancy every month. In each check up, either a doctor
or a nurse examined her pulse, weight and position of the baby. Doctors advised her on
pregnancy planning and preparation. She wanted to deliver at home, as she did during birth of
her first child. But when she met with prolonged labor pain, she was taken to the hospital. The
doctors examined her, administered with injection and waited for 3-4 hours. Finally, she had to
undergo a cesarean section. Five service providers including two doctors and nurses were
present at the time of operation. After operation, Nileema stayed at the hospital for 6 days.
Doctors and nurses visited her regularly and advised her on post pregnancy complications and
newborn care. She is satisfied with the overall condition of the hospital and quality of care
received from the facility.
Since Nileema had to pay for the medicines only, she viewed this as a free-of-cost service. She
reported full satisfaction with the behavior of the doctors, nurses and other service providers.
According to her, quality of service has improved at the facility, especially due to expansion of
service provision, such as, cesarean section. The cost of operation at the facility is much lower
relative to that of a private clinic.
(Case profile: 23-year old married female, mother of two children,
housewife, completed ninth grade of education)

Case study 2: Patients’ readiness– a key to utilization of subsidized cost services against coupon
Salma (fictitious name), a mother of three, gave birth to all of her children at home. After getting
referred by a fieldworker, she visited the hospital in order to receive antenatal care during her last
pregnancy. Salma reported improvement in the services of the facility relative to the previous
years because during one of her previous pregnancies, she came to the hospital, but the provider
did not attend her. This time, the nurse behaved well; she measured weight and pressure,
advised her on pregnancy complications and handed some iron tablets for free. She was advised
to get admitted in the hospital when her water broke. For being a coupon card holder, she
received transportation cost of Taka 100 (US$1.25) - she was very pleased with the money.
However, she had to wait long before receiving the service, and privacy was not maintained
during the physical examination.
Despite having a coupon card that offers transportation cost, medicines and incidental costs,
Salma decided to deliver at home with her mother-in-law performing the delivery. She and the
baby were healthy after the labor. However, when the child was 14-day old, she started suffering
from convulsion and had to be rushed to the hospital. The child was hospitalized for 3 days. The
treatment cost was not much, and the entire expenses were later reimbursed with the coupon
card. Doctors and nurses came on regular visits and behaved well. Salma was satisfied with the
services that her baby received except for an initial delay occurred during the admission. Earlier
she used to visit a doctor at the market place, but upon receiving the coupon she started visiting
the hospital.
(Case profile: 26-year old married female, mother of three children, handicraft artist, completed 5th
grade of education)
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PROVIDERS’ PLACEMENT, SUPERVISION AND RECOGNITION
Incentive payments to the providers are supposed to improve their motivation and performance
level. For measuring the group performance, the team work and spirit are to be enhanced and
providers are to feel appreciated and receive regular monitoring visits, feedbackand recognition.
The group work has become more structured when following guidelines in both intervention groups
relative to the comparison facilities (Table A.2). This change was more pronounced at strategy II
facilities relative to strategy I facilities (Figure 12). A binary logistic regression analysis controlling for
the baseline performance indicated that strategy I and II facilities are twice and six times,
respectively, more likely to follow structured guidelines relative to the comparison facilities (strategy I
OR=2.39, 95% CI, 1.03, 5.55, p<0.043; strategy II OR=5.84, 95% CI, 2.75, 12.42, p<0.00 ).
Receiving regular feedback and appreciation from the supervisors increased at both the strategy
sites; and the changes over time are significantly different at the intervention sites relative to the
comparison sites, but the changes were attenuated upon adjusting for the pre-existing differences
between the strategies. However, providers at both the strategy I and II sites were two times more
likely to receive appreciation (strategy I OR=2.07, p<.136; strategy II OR=2.13, p<0.076) from their
supervisors after adjusting for the baseline performance.
Figure 12. Adhering to the group work guidelines in the facilities across strategies over time (in
percent)

***

*

P4P Final Report 33

COST OF MATERNAL HEALTH SERVICES
Analysis of the cost of incentive payments at all intervention sites shows that the additional cost per
quarter per facility for each maternal health service unit is US$ 8 only (Table 11). Maternal health
services include antenatal care, institutional delivery and postnatal care services for which the
facilities had set targets. The incentive costs include the costs of incentive payments to the
providers, referral incentives paid to the fieldworkers, and costs of supplies and maintenance that
were incurred at the facilities of both strategies I and II. In addition, strategy I facilities incurred costs
for coupon-related payments to the clients and purchase of essential medicines that are not usually
available through the government system. Hence, the total cost per maternal health service unit is
lower at the strategy II sites relative to the strategy I sites ($7 vs. $9). Average providers’ incentive
cost per quarter per facility is much higher at the facilities of strategy II than strategy I ($8,059
versus $5,098), because they engaged more beneficiaries due to the presence of higher number of
eligible beneficiaries, and they also achieved higher levels of incentive than that of the strategy I
facilities. However, by achieving much higher numbers of maternal health service units (1,307
versus 723 per quarter per facility), the providers’ incentive payment cost is lower by US$ 2 per
maternal health service unit at the strategy II sites than at the strategy I sites.

Table 11. Incentive costs per maternal health service unit per quarter by intervention study arms

Sites

Average total incentive
cost per quarter per
facility (US$)

Average number of maternal
health service units per
quarter per facility

Incentive cost per
maternal health
service unit

Strategy I

6,562

723

9

Strategy II

8,521

1,307

7

All intervention
sites

7,215

918

8
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DISSEMINATION
NATIONAL DISSEMINATION WORKSHOP
A two-day national level dissemination
Photo 4. The Chief and Special Guests listening to
workshop was organized in December 2011
the participants on the second day of the workshop
with the Senior Secretary, MoHFW as the
Chief Guest. The Director, Primary Health
Care and Line Director, Maternal, Newborn,
Child and Adolescent Health (MNCAH), DGHS
chaired the workshop. Managers and
providers of both the P4P and DSF
implementing districts and upazilas as well
as the policymakers, researchers and
development partners took part in the event.
The Senior Secretary underscored the
importance of the P4P model for incorporating the quality of care and incorporation of the institutionbased incentives offered to the providers in order to enhance the facility performance. He put
emphasis on examining both the DSF and P4P models to better prepare Bangladesh to address the
MDGs 4 and 5. The participants put forth suggestions for modification of the two models.
SUGGESTIONS ON MODIFICATION OF THE DSF MODEL

Based on the lessons learned from the implementation of a quality of care framework under the P4P
study, the workshop participants unanimously agreed to incorporate the QoC measurement system
into the DSF scheme. For this purpose, consultants from District Hospitals may make quarterly visit
to the Upazila Health Complexes to assess the providers’ qualitative performance. The additional
cost for involving a QAG of two members visiting from the District Hospital to the UHC is $150 per
quarter per facility. Thus, a target of 20 percent increase in the QoC score, for example, from 50 to
60 out of 100 points, will incur $15 per unit of QoC improvement. For an internal quality assurance
system, unit-based “quality assurance teams” can be formed to monitor and review performance
every week and ensure coordination between team members. In providing incentives to the
providers, institutional instead of the individual approach has been suggested. Introduction of
referral incentives for fieldworkers to promote institutional delivery and inclusion of neonates and
under-five children’s services were recommended to better address the MDG 4.
SUGGESTIONS ON MODIFICATION OF THE P4P MODEL

The workshop participants suggested establishing an additional reward system for acknowledging
the outstanding individual performer in each facility along with the existing institution-based
incentive mechanism. Fieldworkers and their supervisors are to be incorporated as beneficiaries,
and a district approach is preferable for building an effective referral system. Expanding the quality
assurance system at all upazilas can be challenging due to limited availability of experts from the
tertiary-level hospitals. Therefore, experts from the districts are suggested to make the performance
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measurement visits to upazilas. Finally, the QAG tools are to be automated for better administration
of the assessment and instant access to the reports.

CHALLENGES
x

Meeting the prerequisites. The prerequisites for initiating a performance incentive scheme
with a team approach include placement of key human resources and equipment and
supplies. But these were not entirely met. Some facilities are chronically constrained by
turnover and vacancy in key human resource positions like anesthesiologist and obstetrician.
Lack of training/refresher training on the EmONC and integrated management of childhood
illnesses hindered quality improvement to the highest desired level. Ineffective utilization of
the MNCH funds limited the capacity of the QATs to bring into the ideal changes. The District
Hospitals that have 100 beds and UHCs of 31 beds were constrained in terms of space, and
were not able to offer adequate level of privacy, food and other amenities to the clients.
Besides the providers were over-burdened, especially with higher demand created through
the coupon distribution in strategy I sites.

x

Weak health information system. A strong health information system providing timely and
accurate data is vital to measure performance. The weak MIS remained a challenge to
establish the benchmark levels and track the performance. Therefore, special forms had to
be developed for collecting data from a number of registers maintained by several providers.
In some cases, providers were found not keeping records; in such cases, for instance, for
family planning counseling it had been difficult to establish a benchmark level. An automated
MIS and training on record keeping, as envisioned by the DGHS, may solve such problems.
However, strengthening of the MIS should remain constant across all sites along with the
comparison sites in order to ensure that changes in the service volume due to strengthening
of the MIS do not get accounted for against the incentive related intervention.

x

Awareness on the incentive mechanism. Although incentive calculation for the providers is
simple (e.g., each receiving one-month basic salary for a quarter’s performance), not every
beneficiaries well understood the process at the beginning. Turning over of the staff in the
middle of the quarter required complicated calculation of proportional payment. Placing
some MNCH team nurses at the different units of facilities hindered the intended tie
between the payment and performance.

x

Incentivizing the EmONC complications management. Obstetrics, newborn and under-five
child complications management service volumes could not be incentivized on ethical
ground although service statistics had been monitored for tracking performance. Quality of
care in EmONC complications management was incentivized through incorporating indicators
in the quality assessment tool.

x

Team dynamics. The team dynamics played a key role in facility performance. A few
providers took the incentive as granted; they received incentives without any effort due to
improved facility performance by a number of providers. Therefore, the P4P Committees
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were given responsibility to ensure payment to the performing providers only. Some providers
expressed dissatisfaction for not receiving incentives due to non-performance of other units.
They were advised to create peer pressure to improve the facility performance in
consultation of the P4P Committees.
x

Measurement of the quality of care. The measurement of the quality of care of MNCH
services underwent several revisions to reflect the needs of the facilities. The instrument is
appreciated for being detailed, but also criticized for being a long checklist requiring at least
4 hours for its administration. The QAG members later decided to divide themselves into two
groups to measure their respective units simultaneously except for the operation theater,
and the initial and closing decision-making feedback sessions with the P4P Committees.

x

Financial mechanism. Establishing the financial mechanism to track each payment and
services involving multiple providers and clients and keeping vouchers for each transaction
remained challenging. The competency of the financial operations team was enhanced
through interactive workshop, supportive follow-up and on the job training. Issuing of account
payee checks saved time to draw, count and disburse cash. However, if all beneficiaries
maintained accounts in the bank, the process could be simplified by writing a single letter on
bank transfer. The clients received cash for non-repetitive incentive amount for
transportation or incidental costs; and fieldworkers for referring cases to intervention
facilities. With the introduction of mobile cash transfer, challenges relating to cash transfer
can be better addressed in future.

LESSONS LEARNED
x

Facility response to the incentive. Facilities with sub-optimal performance tend to respond to
the performance targets in terms of increasing quantity and quality of MNCH care if it is tied
with incentives in spite of the human resource and other constraints. Managers and
providers become innovative to improve the services. However, non-functional facilities
cannot be incorporated into the program without upgrading them to a certain functional
level.

x

Motivation. Motivation level varies across providers. Nurses, indirect providers,
administrative and support staff perceive more financial benefits than doctors and
consultants for having lower opportunity cost of time. Special acknowledgement and reward
system can be developed to motivate the doctors.

x

Human resources and infrastructure. Key human resources are to be placed and provided
with necessary training and refresher training. Mentoring through the quality assurance
groups provides impromptu insights on key issues, but it does not replace the need for
formal training to increase competency of the providers to offer better care. The facilities also
need to improve the infrastructure in case of higher bed occupancy in order to ensure better
care.
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x

QAG and QAT tools. Accountability of the managers and providers can be increased through
administration of the QAG and QAT tools. The visual tool administered by the QATs improves
the internal monitoring system. The QAG tool empowers the external experts to measure
performance and provide constructive feedback. Sharing the tools across all the actors is the
key to success of the program. Outcome indicators need to be included in the tool.

x

Target threshold levels. Setting institutional targets based on the past performance and
providing group incentives can increase the cost of delivery per facility if the facilities
historically have been performing at a very low level. In such case, facilities can be enrolled
only after achieving a threshold level of performance targets in order to minimize the cost of
incentive per institutional delivery.

x

Health information system. Weak health information system hinders measuring the
performance. Introducing any incentive mechanism needs strengthening of the MIS.

x

Client response to the incentive. The coupon clients responded well in terms of receiving the
antenatal care services but were reluctant for having deliveries at the facilities. Intensive
advocacy at the community levels and increasing the quality of antenatal care may
encourage them to plan delivery at the facilities. Certain level of infrastructure is pivotal to
ensure quality of care in terms of offering privacy to the clients. Roundtrip transportation cost
should be paid in actual and awareness raising activities are must to generate demand for
services.

x

Validation. Incorporating the auditor’s validation on service volume and exit client interviews
measuring the client satisfaction is important. Considering results from the validation into
performance measurement is likely to improve providers’ attitude towards clients and
increase their level of satisfaction.

x

Inadequate time for interventions. The 14-month intervention duration has been highly
inadequate to carry out the intended intervention activities to bring about changes at the
outcome level. In order to ensure the complete care for the pregnant women among at least
two cohorts of the pregnant women to bring sustainable change in the community requires at
least a 24-month intervention period for evaluation.

NEXT STEPS
The need for performance-based financing programs on key maternal, newborn and child health care
services is beyond dispute, especially until the MDG targets are met and the health systems are
further strengthened. Given the increasing emphasis on the quality, introduction of quality of care
measures into the DSF program is critical. In this regard, the experiences, tools and findings of the
P4P pilot study can be useful to improve the maternal and newborn health community served by the
DSF program. The DSF model is poised for national level expansion; therefore, it can be modified to
incorporate the QoC framework tested in the P4P project after intensive consultation and discussion.
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The services against vouchers can also be expanded for the newborn care and under-five children’s
complications management to reduce the newborn, infant and under-five child mortality under the
DSF program.
In the non-DSF but high priority and low performing areas with high level of maternal, newborn and
child mortality and morbidity, the P4P model has the potential to improve the health facility response
in providing improved quality and volume of MNCH services. The modified model needs to be tested
at a larger number of facilities and with a longer duration.
The research design compromised at the pilot study should be avoided in future evaluations to
enable the measurement of the outcome indicators by carrying out population-based surveys. For
example, an evaluation using baseline and endline surveys across the intervention and comparison
groups could inform the changes occurring at the population level in terms of met need, service
utilization, client satisfaction, morbidity and wellbeing of the clients. For validation through
triangulation, it is important to collect and analyze the service statistics data. In the absence of
population-based surveys, the current study employed service statistics data alone. However, due to
resource constraints, each strategy did not have similar number of facilities; therefore, variability
remained high in the unbalanced design.
The P4P models offering incentives to the providers, with or without the demand-side financing, hold
great potential to enable the health facilities to provide better quality of care bringing greater
accountability and transparency into the health system. Therefore, these strategies are to be
pursued under the health financing schemes of the country.
Given both the strategies performed well relative to the comparison site, the strategy II with
incentives for providers alone can be introduced at the low performing but poorer regions; while the
poorest areas with greater geographical draw back will benefit from a combination of a demand plus
supply side P4P approach. Clients living in the regions with poorer geographical accessibility are
likely to have higher demand side barriers in terms of transportation cost and other sociodemographic indicators; therefore, they may benefit more from demand side financing for essential
MNCH services relative to clients living in the regions with limited geographical constraints.
It is acknowledged that monetary incentives alone are NOT enough to improve the MNCH services.
The long-term solution is about putting a stronger system in place through placing the adequate
human resources, strengthening the facilities with necessary equipment, drugs and supplies, making
the quality assurance system functional, providing mentoring and coaching, supervision, and
strengthening the health information system and governance to address the health system building
blocks for improving the quality of care in order to improve the quality of life of the patients; and also
improving the work environment and satisfaction of the providers. Linking with incentives may
facilitate achieving these goals.
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***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05 ~p<0.10.T0- Benchmark- Average volume per quarter from one year’s data immediately prior to the intervention period; T1Average volume per quarter over the intervention period; T0 -T1- Over time: Benchmark versus Intervention period average.Diff- difference in percentages
pct(T1-T0)/pctT0.

Postnatal
care

Normal
delivery

Institutional
delivery

Antenatal
care

T0

T0

T1

Strategy II

Strategy I

Table A.1. Maternal health service volume across arms and over time
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T0

T1
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Table A.2. Providers’ supervision and receiving of feedback and recognition across arms and over time

Table A.3. Average quarterly services on pregnant women, newborn and under-five complications
management across arms and over time
Sites

Strategy-I
sites

Mean
(sd)
Diff %

Strategy –
II sites

Mean
(sd)
Diff %

Comparis
on sites

Mean
(sd)
Diff %

Pregnancy complications
management

Newborn complications
management

Under-five complications
management

Before
intervention

Before
intervention

Before
intervention

During
intervention

20
(28)

45
(51)

123%*
31
(44)

19
(34)

53
(79)

172%~
65
(83)

113%
43
(46)

During
intervention

1
(2)

85%

28
(40)
164%

620
(1,018)

699
(928)

13%
68
(110)

5962%
79
(75)

During
intervention

363
(204)

385
(212)

6%
75
(114)

1,046
(1,359)

818
(1,210)

-22%

~Two tailed paired t-test significant at p<0.10; *p<0.05.

Note. Differences between Strategy I and Comparison sites, and Strategy II and Comparison sites as well as
between Strategy I and Strategy II sites for delivery and newborn complications management services are nonsignificant. Differences between Strategies I and II for under-five children’s complications management services are
non-significant. However, differences between Strategy I and Comparison sites for under-five children’s complications
management services are significant at p<0.05; and the differences between Strategy II and Comparison sites for
under-five children’s complications management services are significant at p<0.10 .
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